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Abstract
We consider the transfer pricing decision for a multidivisional rm with an upstream division and
multiple downstream divisions. The downstream divisions can independently determine their retail
prices, and decide on whether or not they will purchase from the upstream division at negotiated transfer
prices. To allocate the rm-wide prot between upstream and downstream divisions, we construct a
cooperative game, show the convexity of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer
prices for the rm.
Key words: Transfer price, cooperative game theory, the core, Shapley value.
1 Introduction
The transfer pricing problem is of signicant importance to multidivisional rms which need to consider
the allocation of rm-wide prot between an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. In
such transfer pricing problems, all divisions of a rm can independently make their decisions as if they
were operating in a decentralized setting. This means that all downstream divisions can determine their
own retail prices, and decide on whether or not they will buy from the upstream division at negotiated
transfer prices. For details regarding the transfer pricing decision in multidivisional rms, see online
Appendix A.
In this paper, we consider the transfer pricing decisions of a multidivisional rm where the upstream
and downstream divisions negotiate the transfer price that results in a fair allocation of the maximum
system-wide prot surplus among three or more divisions. The downstream divisions then determine
their retail prices. In this paper, to reect the fact that customers are sensitive to retail prices, we
assume that the demand in the market a downstream division serves is dependent on the divisions
retail pricing decision. We learn from Göx and Schiller [7] that most transfer pricing publications
assumed the demand to be independent of the retail price, i.e., a constant ; and we nd that only a
few recent publications (e.g., Arya and Mittendorf [1], Baldenius and Reichelstein [2]) used a linear,
deterministic, price-dependent demand function for transfer pricing problems.
We assume that the upstream divisions unit production cost is not a constant but a decreasing,
convex function of the production quantity i.e., the downstream divisions order quantity, or the
demand faced by the downstream division. Such a modeling approach renders our model and analysis
more realistic, because it is consistent with the wide existence of economies of scale,see, e.g., Lingnau
[12]. The quantity-dependent cost function also distinguishes our paper from other transfer pricing
papers.
In reality, the upstream division of a multidivisional rm usually sells its intermediate products to
multiple downstream divisions that are located in di¤erent marketing areas. In Section 2, we analyze
the transfer pricing decisions for such a system by using cooperative game theory. We believe that
this is an appropriate methodology for our transfer-pricing analysis because all downstream divisions
of a multidivisional rm are free to determine whether or not they will buy from the upstream
division at negotiated transfer prices. Specically, each division is able to decide on whether it will
trade with the upstream division in a non-cooperative setting or in a cooperative setting. In the non-
cooperative setting, the upstream and downstream members make their transfer prices and retail prices
in Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively. In the cooperative setting, the downstream members choose
the globally-optimal retail prices that maximize the system-wide prot, and negotiate transfer prices
with the upstream member. In order to guarantee that the downstream members are willing to adopt
the globally-optimal retail prices, we will use cooperative game theory to nd the negotiated transfer
prices assuring that the downstream members are better (by achieving more prots) in the cooperative
setting than in the non-cooperative setting.
Therefore, for the multidivisional rm with a single upstream division and n downstream divisions
with n  2, we construct an (n + 1)-division cooperative game in characteristic function form, and
prove that the characteristic value function is supermodular, that is, the game is convex and thus
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superadditive. We also show that our game has a non-empty core, and use the concept of Shapley value
(Shapley [15]) to nd a unique allocation scheme. Note that Shapley value is a proper concept for our
analysis because it is in the core due to the convexity of our game. We then calculate n transfer prices
for the n downstream divisions, using the Shapley value-based allocation scheme. Our proofs for all
theorems and corollaries are delegated to online Appendices C and D, respectively.
An important contribution of our paper to the literature is the application of n-player cooperative
game theory (with n  3) to transfer pricing problems. To the best of our knowledge, very few transfer
pricing-related publications (for example, Rosenthal [14]) applied this important methodology. Our
model di¤ers from [14] because of the following three facts: (i) As mentioned above, we consider the
quantity-dependent production cost and the price-sensitive demand functions; Rosenthal [14] assumed
a constant production cost and a deterministic demand. (ii) We investigate the two-echelon system
involving a single upstream division and multiple downstream divisions, whereas Rosenthal [14] consid-
ered an n-echelon (n  3) system in which there is a single division at each level. (iii) We compute the
rm-wide prot surplus as the di¤erence between the prot in the cooperative setting and that in the
non-cooperative setting. In [14], each divisions prot in the non-cooperative setting was assumed to be
zero; thus, each players prot surplus was equal to the players prot in the cooperative setting.
2 Transfer Pricing Decisions
In this section, we investigate the transfer pricing problem for a two-echelon system (multidivisional
rm) involving an upstream division U and n  2 downstream divisions (i.e., Dj , j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). Such
a system is very common in practice. For example, Ford Motor Companys Struandale engine plant
in South Africa (an upstream division) supplies the Duratorq TDCi diesel engines to the rms global
assembly plants (multiple downstream divisions) which make the Ford Ranger pick-up trucks [5]. Those
assembly plants are actually freeto decide on whether they can buy from the plant in South Africa
at negotiated transfer prices in the cooperative setting or at non-cooperative (Stackelberg equilibrium)
transfer prices. Walmarts o¢ ce GP USA Exportat its Arkansas headquarters (an upstream division),
as a branch of the Walmart Global Procurement, is mainly responsible to purchase and sell quality U.S.
products to its global stores, which are allowed to negotiate transfer prices with headquarters in the
cooperative setting or buy at the transfer prices in the non-cooperative (Stackelberg game) setting [20].
In the multidivisional rm under study, the upstream division U sells its intermediate products
which are identical to each other to n  2 downstream divisions. We assume that, to improve the
rm-wide performance, the n divisions Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n) are located in, and serve, n di¤erent markets
to reduce the possibility of competition between two, or among three or more, downstream divisions.
Each division is freeto decide on whether it trades with other divisions in a non-cooperative setting
or in a cooperative setting. In the non-cooperative setting, the upstream division U rst announces
its transfer price to the downstream divisions Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), who then respond by determining
their retail prices. For this sequential-movescenario, divisions U and Dj act as the leaderand the
follower, respectively; accordingly, we need to nd Stackelberg equilibrium to characterize the two
echelonsdecisions. In the cooperative setting, the n+ 1 divisions including the upstream division U
and n  2 downstream divisions jointly make their decisions to maximize the system-wide prot that
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is the sum of all divisionsprots.
In order to entice n + 1 divisions to cooperate, the multidivisional rm should divide the prot
surplus which is the di¤erence between the system-wide prot in the cooperative setting and that in
the non-cooperative setting under a fair allocation scheme that is acceptable to all divisions. To do
so, we develop a cooperative game model in characteristic-function form, and use the solution concepts
of core and Shapley value to determine a fair allocation scheme and calculate the transfer price between
the upstream division U and each downstream division. Note that, since there are n  2 downstream
divisions, we need to determine n transfer prices.
Next, we develop the prot functions for divisions U and Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). Division Dj (j =
1; 2; : : : ; n) makes its retail pricing decision pj and sells qj(pj) units of its nal products to serve market
j. Similar to [1] and [2], division Djs sales quantity is determined by the deterministic, linear demand
function qj(pj) = aj   bjpj with aj ; bj > 0 and pj  aj=bj . Note that all downstream members face
independent demands [i.e., qj(pj) (for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n) are independent of each other], because they
are located in di¤erent marketing areas, as assumed in Section 1. Thus, this divisions prot j(pj) is
calculated as,
j(pj) = (pj   Tj)qj(pj) = (pj   Tj)(aj   bjpj), (1)
where Tj denotes the transfer price that division Dj pays to division U .
Since division U sells its intermediate products to serve all of n downstream divisions, division Us
total sale quantity is Q(q)  Pnj=1 qj(pj), where q  (q1(p1); : : : ; qn(pn)). As discussed in Section 1,
this divisions unit production cost is dependent on the production quantity, because of the existence
of economies of scale, for details, see, e.g., Lingnau [12]. Hence, the unit production cost which is
incurred by division U when this division makes Q(q) units of intermediate products can be written
as c(Q(q)). We assume that c() is a decreasing, convex function of the production quantity; that
is, c0()  0 and c00()  0. Moreover, similar to Lingnau [12], we assume that 1 + bjc0()  0, for
j = 1; : : : ; n. This means that the system-wide unit prot i.e., the sum of the upstream divisions
and n downstream divisionsunit prots is increasing in each downstream divisions retail price. For
details, see online Appendix B. For other publications involving a linear, decreasing cost function of
the quantity, see, for example, Gray et al. [8], Jaag [10], and Moorthy [13]. Di¤ering from the above
publications, we do not consider any specic function but use the general form c(Q(q)) for our analysis.
Division Us prot generated by trading with division Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), denoted by i, is calcu-
lated as its sale revenue minus its production cost, i.e., j = Tjqj(pj)   c(Q(q))qj(pj). Total prot 
that division U can realize by trading with n downstream divisions are thus found as,
 =
Xn
j=1
j =
Xn
j=1
[Tj   c(Q(q))]qj(pj). (2)
2.1 Cooperative Game Model
We now use multi-person cooperative game theory to solve the transfer pricing problem for n+1 divisions
with n  2. Following von Neumann and Morgenstern [19, Ch. VI], we construct a cooperative game
in characteristic-function form by computing the characteristic value of each possible coalition, which is
dened as the minimum prot surplus that all divisions in the coalition can guarantee to achieve jointly
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when all the other divisions form an opposing coalition and try to minimize the prot surplus to the
coalition. Next, we compute the characteristic values of all possible coalitions. In the empty coalition
?, there is no division and the prot surplus is certainly zero. Thus, the characteristic value of the
empty coalition is v(?) = 0.
2.1.1 The Characteristic Values of One-Division Coalitions
If division i = U;D1; D2; : : : ; Dn does not cooperate with any other division(s), then it forms the one-
division coalition (i), where it is the only member. For our problem, v(i) is the security-levelprot
surplus that division i can achieve by itself when other divisions form an opposing coalition.
Theorem 1 For the cooperative game under consideration, we always have v(U) = 0. If 2c0(Q) +
c00(Q)Q  0 for any production quantity Q, then the characteristic value of each single-division coalition
must be zero, i.e., v(i) = 0, for i = Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). 
The above theorem indicates that whether v(Di) = 0 (for i = 1; : : : ; n) depends on the condition
2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0 for any production quantity Q. We note that, if the upstream division Us unit
production cost c() is specied as a linear, decreasing function as in Gray et al. [8], Jaag [10], and
Moorthy [13], then c0() < 0 and c00() = 0, and thus, the condition that 2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0 must be
satised. To facilitate our analysis, we hereafter assume that 2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0 for any production
quantity Q.
2.1.2 The Characteristic Values of k-Division Coalitions with k  2
We calculate the characteristic value of the k-division coalition Ck (2  k  n+ 1), in which k divisions
trade in the cooperative setting. When k = n + 1, Ck = Cn+1, which is called the grand coalition
in which all of n + 1 divisions cooperate. We note that the coalition Ck may or may not include the
upstream division U . If the coalition Ck involves U , then there are k   1 downstream divisions in Ck;
otherwise, all of k members in Ck are downstream divisions.
To nd the characteristic value v(Ck), we need to calculate the minimum prot surplus that the
k members in Ck jointly achieve by their own e¤orts. Hence, we should consider the impact of the
decisions of the other (n   k + 1) divisions who are not in the coalition Ck on total prot of the k
members in Ck. As discussed previously, we calculate the value of v(Ck), assuming that the (n  k+ 1)
divisions (that are not in Ck) do not cooperate but behave in the non-cooperative setting where the
upstream division U acts as the leader and the downstream divisions that are not in Ck act as the
followers and choose the transfer prices in Stackelberg equilibrium. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1,
we nd that, if division U is not in the k-division coalition Ck, then the prot surplus of each member
in Ck is zero. That is, if U =2 Ck, then v(Ck) = 0.
Next, we calculate v(Ck) when U 2 Ck. Note that, if the upstream division joins Ck, then (k   1)
downstream divisions are in Ck and thus, there are Cnk 1 = n!=[(k   1)!(n  k + 1)!] possible k-division
coalitions, which are denoted by Crk, r = 1; 2; : : : ; C
n
k 1. Note that the upstream division U and the
(n   k + 1) divisions Dj =2 Crk adopt their transfer prices T^ (k;r)j and retail prices p^(k;r)j in Stackelberg
equilibrium, respectively. [In this paper, the symbol ( ^ ) indicates the Stackelberg equilibrium.] To
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nd Stackelberg equilibria for the divisions U and Dj =2 Crk, we use the following three steps. In the
rst step, given the retail price p(k;r)j , we maximize the upstream division Us prot  in (2) to nd its
best-response transfer price. In the second step, we substitute the best-response transfer price into the
downstream division Djs prot j(pj) in (1), and maximize it to obtain Djs Stackelberg equilibrium-
characterized retail price as p^(k;r)j = [aj + 2qj(p^
(k;r)
j )]=(2bj) + [c(Q(q; k; r)) + c
0(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r)]=2,
where Q(q; k; r)  PfijDi2Crkg qi(p(k;r)i ) + PfjjDj =2Crkg qj(p^(k;r)j ) with p(k;r)i denoting the retail price of
division Di in the coalition Crk. In the third step, we substitute p^
(k;r)
j into the upstream division Us
best response function, and obtain the transfer price in Stackelberg equilibrium T^ (k;r)j as,
T^
(k;r)
j =
2
bj
qj(p^
(k;r)
j ) + c(Q(q; k; r)) + c
0(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r). (3)
Next, we calculate the characteristic value v(Crk). In the coalition C
r
k, division U and the (k   1)
downstream divisions cooperate to jointly determine the optimal retail pricing decisions (i.e., p(k;r)i , for
i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) maximizing their total prot (k;r), which is given as,
(k;r) =
X
fijDi2Crkg
p
(k;r)
i qi(p
(k;r)
i )  c(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r) +
X
fjjDj =2Crkg
T^
(k;r)
j qj(p^
(k;r)
j ). (4)
Theorem 2 Consider the k-division (3  k  n + 1) coalition Crk (r = 1; 2; : : : ; Cnk 1) including the
upstream division U and the (k   1) downstream divisions. The downstream divisionsoptimal retail
prices p(k;r)i (i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) that maximize (k;r) in (4) satisfy the following equation:
2p
(k;r)
i =
ai
bi
+ c(Q(q; k; r)) + c0(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r), for Di 2 Crk, (5)
where Q(q; k; r) PfijDi2Crkg qi(p(k;r)i ) +PfjjDj =2Crkg qj(p^(k;r)j ). We also nd that the upstream divi-
sion Us transfer prices T^ (k;r)j that is paid by the downstream divisions Dj =2 Crk can be obtained by
substituting Q(q; k; r) into (3). Moreover, the characteristic value v(Crk) is calculated as,
v(Crk) =
X
fijDi2Crkg
f[p(k;r)i   c(Q(q; k; r))]qi(p(k;r)i )  [p^(1)i   c(Q^(q))]qi(p^(1)i )g
+
X
fjjDj =2Crkg
f[T^ (k;r)j   c(Q(q; k; r))]qj(p^(k;r)j )  [T^ (1)j   c(Q^(q))]qj(p^(1)j )g.  (6)
Note that in (6), Q^(q) Pni=1 qi(p^(1)i ); T^ (1)i and p^(1)i = (ai+biT^ (1)i )=(2bi) (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) respectively
denote the upper division Us and downstream division Dis Stackelberg equilibria when U trades with
each downstream division in the non-cooperative setting. We can also nd that, under the assumption
that 2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0 for any production quantity Q, both p(k;r)i and T^ (k;r)j are decreasing in k.
This means that, if more downstream divisions join a coalition, then the optimal retail prices of all
downstream divisions in the coalition and the upstream division Us Stackelberg transfer prices to the
downstream divisions Dj =2 Crk should be reduced.
We also learn from (5) that, if division Di joins the coalition Crk, then division Dis and division Us
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total prot margin [p(k;r)i   c(Q(q; k; r))] is computed as qi(p(k;r)i )=bi + c0(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r); and
division Us prot margin [T^ (k;r)j   c(Q(q; k; r))] for its trade with division Dj =2 Crk is calculated as
2qj(p^
(k;r)
j )=bj + c
0(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r).
Corollary 1 If division Di is in the coalition Crk, then total prot margin [i.e., p
(k;r)
i  c(Q(q; k; r))] of
divisions U and Di is increasing in k; but, the prot margin is a convex function of qi(p
(k;r)
i ) if c
000()  0.
Similarly, we nd that, if division Dj =2 Ck, then division Us prot margin [i.e., T^ (k;r)j   c(Q(q; k; r))]
is increasing in k, but it is a convex function of qj(p^
(k;r)
j ) if c
000()  0. 
We nd that, in most relevant publications such as [8], [10], and [13], the authors assumed the
linearity of the function c(), which implies c000() = 0. In our paper, we do not impose a specic form
on the function c() for our game analysis but only assume that it is decreasing and convex with the
property c000()  0.
We note that, when k = n+1, division U and all downstream divisions form the grand coalition Cn+1
to jointly make their globally-optimal decisions. Following Theorem 2, we nd that the characteristic
value v(Cn+1) which denotes the prot surplus generated when all divisions of the multidivisional
rm cooperate can be written as v(Cn+1) =
Pn
i=1f[p(n+1)i   c(Q(q;n + 1))]qi(p(n+1)i )   [p^(1)i  
c(Q^(q))]qi(p^
(1)
i )g, which is the sum of all divisionsprot surpluses. We also nd that v(Cn+1)  0,
because, according to Corollary 1, total prot surplus of division U and the downstream division Di
i.e., [p(n+1)i   c(Q(q;n+ 1))]qi(p(n+1)i )  [p^(1)i   c(Q^(q))]qi(p^(1)i ) is non-negative.
Corollary 2 The characteristic value v(Crk) is an increasing function of k; i.e., as more divisions join a
coalition to cooperate, they can jointly realize a higher prot surplus. 
2.2 Prot Allocation and Transfer Prices
The characteristic values [v(?); v(i), i = U;D1; D2; : : : ; Dn; v(Ck), 2  k  n+1] that we computed in
Section 2.1 constitute the (n+ 1)-division cooperative game model G for our transfer pricing problem
involving division U and n divisions Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). It is interesting and, we think, important
to determine whether or not our cooperative game in characteristic-function form is superadditive and
convex ; for more information about superadditive and convex games, see, for example, Stra¢ n [17].
Since any convex cooperative game must be superadditive, we subsequently show the convexity of
our game. To do so, we need to examine the supermodularity of the characteristic function, because a
cooperative game is convex and also superadditive if its characteristic function is supermodular (Shapley
[16]).
Theorem 3 For our (n + 1)-division cooperative game, the characteristic function is supermodular;
thus, the game G is convex and also superadditive. 
As Theorem 3 implies, when more divisions form a coalition, the characteristic value of the coalition
is higher. It thus follows that all divisions in our (n + 1)-player cooperative game in characteristic-
function form should have the incentive to join the grand coalition Cn+1. This means that the grand
coalition Cn+1 is stable if v(Cn+1) is allocated to all divisions in a fair manner. Next, we consider the
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fair allocation of the characteristic value (total prot surplus) v(Cn+1). We let yU denote the prot
surplus allocated to division U , and yDj denote the surplus allocated to division Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n).
Using yi, for i = U;D1; D2; : : : ; Dn, we can characterize a proper allocation scheme by using an (n+ 1)-
tuple of numbers y  (yU ; yD1 ; yD2 ; : : : ; yDn) with the following two properties: (i) individual rationality,
i.e., yi  v(i) = 0, for all i 2 Cn+1 = (U;D1; D2; : : : ; Dn); (ii) collective rationality, i.e.,
P
i2Cn+1 yi =
v(Cn+1); see Stra¢ n [17]. In cooperative game theory there are a number of concepts that could be
used for our analysis of the (n+ 1)-player cooperative game in characteristic form. As Leng and Parlar
[11] described, one of the most important concepts is the core (Gillies [6]).
Theorem 4 For our (n+ 1)-division cooperative game, the core is non-empty. 
As the above theorem indicates, any point in the non-empty core represents a fair allocation scheme.
To nd a unique allocation solution, we next focus on the fair allocation in terms of the Shapley value [15],
which is the unique imputation (yU ; yD1 ; yD2 ; : : : ; yDn) where the payo¤s yi (i = U;D1; D2; : : : ; Dn) are
distributed fairlyby an arbitrator.Note that, in this paper, the headquarters of the multidivisional
rm act as the arbitrator; in fact, as Göx and Schiller [7] reviewed, in many transfer pricing-related
publications, the headquarters were assumed to be responsible for the coordination of all divisions.
Theorem 5 For the downstream division Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), the Shapley value yDj is calculated as
yDj =
Pn+1
k=2
PCn 1k 2
r=1 (k   1)!(n+ 1  k)![v(Crk(U;Dj))  v(Crk(U;Dj)  fDjg)]
(n+ 1)!
, (7)
where v(Crk(U;Dj)) and v(C
r
k(U;Dj) fDjg) can be calculated by using (6). For the upstream division
U , the Shapley value yU is calculated as y

U = v(Cn+1) 
Pn
j=1 y

Dj
. 
Next, we use the Shapley value given in the above theorem to compute the transfer prices for n
downstream divisions Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), which is shown in this following theorem.
Theorem 6 The transfer price T j (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) that division Dj pays to division U is calculated
as,
T j =p
(n+1)
j  
4bjy

Dj
+ (aj   bj T^ (1)j )2
4bjqj(p
(n+1)
j )
, (8)
where T^ (1)j , p
(n+1)
j and y

Dj
can be computed by using Theorems 2 and 5. 
To illustrate our above analysis, we provide the following numerical example.
Example 1 We consider a multidivisional rm involving an upstream division (U) and 3 downstream
divisions Dj (j = 1; 2; 3). Division Dj purchases the intermediate products from U at the transfer price
T
(k;r)
j , and then determines their retail prices p
(k;r)
j and satises the demand qj(p
(k;r)
j ) = aj   bjp(k;r)j
with the following parameter values: a1 = 100, b1 = 0:5; a2 = 90, b2 = 0:2; a3 = 110, b3 = 1.
The upstream division Us unit production cost function is given as c(Q(q)) = 5   0:01Q(q), where
q = (q1(p1); q2(p2); q3(p3)) and Q(q) =
P3
j=1 qj(pj).
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We can calculate the characteristic values for all possible coalitions, as specied in online Appendix
E, and thus develop our cooperative game as follows:
v(?) = v(U) = v(D1) = v(D2) = v(D3) = v(D1D2) = v(D1D3) = v(D2D3) = 0,
v(UD1) = 1; 218:45, v(UD2) = 2; 501:28, v(UD3) = 722; v(D1D2D3) = 0,
v(UD1D2) = 3; 732:02, v(UD1D3) = 1; 953:72, v(UD2D3) = 3; 236:54; v(UD1D2D3) = 4; 479:49.
We can easily nd that the above game is a convex game with an non-empty core, as shown in Theorems
3 and 4. Using Theorem 5, we calculate the Shapley value which is used to allocate the system-
wide prot surplus v(UD1D2D3) = 4; 479:49 among the four divisions as follows: yU = $2; 418:61,
yD1 = $566:71, y

D2
= $1; 154:67, and yD3 = $339:5. Then, we use Theorem 6 to nd transfer prices as:
T 1 = $65:31, T 2 = $144:75, T 3 = $36:72. C
We learn from the above example that the prot surpluses (yDj , for j = 1; 2; 3) allocated to three
downstream divisions depend on di¤erent values of three divisionsdemand parameters (i.e., aj and
bj). Specically, we note that, if the downstream division j has a larger value of the ratio aj=bj ,
then the division should gain more allocations, which is possibly attributed to the following reason:
Equation (5) shows that, in the grand coalition Cn+1, a larger value of aj=bj will result in a higher
retail price p(n+1)j for the downstream division j (compared with other divisions), because the value of
c(Q(q;n + 1)) + c0(Q(q;n + 1))Q(q;n + 1) is the same to all downstream divisions. As discussed in
Section 2.1.2, the system-wide unit prot is
Pn
j=1[p
(n+1)
j   c(Q(q;n+ 1))], where the division j with
a higher retail price p(n+1)j makes a larger contribution. This may lead the Shapley value to suggest
a higher prot surplus allocated to the division j. Noting that the inverse form of our linear demand
function is pj = aj=bj   qj(pj)=bj , we nd that aj=bj can be interpreted as the upper limit for division
js retail price. Thus, we conclude from the above that a downstream division with a higher upper limit
for its retail price should obtain a larger allocation of the system-wide prot surplus.
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the transfer pricing decisions for a multidivisional rm with a single up-
stream division and multiple downstream divisions. The upstream division manufactures its intermedi-
ate products and incurs a quantity-dependent production cost, and each downstream division uses the
intermediate products to make nal products and satisfy the retail price-sensitive demand. We compute
the rm-wide prot surplus as the prot in the cooperative setting minus that in the non-cooperative
setting, construct an (n + 1)-division cooperative game model, and use cooperative game theory to
fairly allocate the prot surplus among three or more divisions. We show that, as more divisions join a
coalition to cooperate, each downstream divisions retail price decreases. Moreover, we prove that the
characteristic function of the cooperative game is supermodular, which means that our game is convex
and superadditive. We also show that the core of this game is non-empty. Then, we compute Shapley
value for our game to nd a unique, fair allocation scheme, which is in the core because of the convexity
of our game. Thus, the allocation scheme suggested by the Shapley value can assure the stability of
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the grand coalition. Using the Shapley value, we nd analytical transfer-pricing decisions that the n
downstream divisions pay to the upstream division. In this paper, the application of cooperative game
theory with three or more players to transfer pricing analysis is our most important contribution; this
modeling approach is expected to help other cooperation-related research projects.
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Transfer Pricing in a Multidivisional Firm: A Cooperative Game Analysis
M. Leng and M. Parlar
Appendix A A Brief Description of the Transfer Pricing Decision in
Multidivisional Firms
The transfer pricing problem is of signicant importance to multidivisional rms which need to consider
the allocation of rm-wide prot between an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. More
precisely, in a multidivisional rm, an upstream division sells its intermediate products to a downstream
division which then makes the nal products to serve a market. The side-payment from the downstream
division to the upstream division is calculated as the transfer price times the downstream divisions
purchase quantity. Since the upstream divisions sales revenue is equal to the downstream divisions
total purchase cost, the side-payment does not impact the rm-wide prot (i.e., the sum of the two
divisionsprots), which only depends on the retail price at which the downstream division serves its
market. However, in order to fairly allocate the rm-wide prot between the two divisions, the rm
must make the transfer pricing decision judiciously. Since for each unit of the intermediate product, the
downstream division pays the transfer price to the upstream division, a higher transfer price brings more
prot to the upstream division but a lower transfer price benets the downstream division. When the
rms upstream and downstream divisions jointly determine the retail price to maximize the rm-wide
prot, the rm must address the critical question of setting the transfer price to allocate the maximum
rm-wide prot between the two divisions.1
It is natural to expect that, in practice, a multidivisional rm may desire to coordinate its divisions
for the maximization of rm-wide after-tax prot through the transfer pricing decision. Specically, if
the tax rate for the rms downstream division is lower than that for its upstream division, then the
rm may reduce the transfer price to increase the downstream divisions taxable prot and decrease
the upstream divisions taxable prot. As a result, the rms total after-tax prot i.e., the sum of the
downstream divisions and the upstream divisions after-tax prots rises. (If the upstream division is
located in a lower-tax jurisdiction, then increasing the transfer price results in an increase in the rms
after-tax prot.) For example, as upheld by Canadas Federal Court of Appeal, the General Electric
Capital Canada Inc. developed a transfer pricing rule to deduct from its income a C$136.4 million fee
paid to its U.S. parent. The Walmart store in Bentonville in Arkansas recently reported that the retailer
had achieved signicant tax savings in 2010, which were largely related to changes in transfer pricing
policies in a foreign jurisdiction. For more examples, see, e.g., a recent report [18] by Tax Management
Inc., a subsidiary of The Bureau of National A¤airs, Inc.
As observed in the General Electric and Walmart examples, such a transfer pricing decision could
result in a loss of tax revenue in a high-tax jurisdiction (province or state), which may thus desire to
impose a fair transfer pricing rule on multidivisional rms. To prevent multidivisional rms from
intentionally transferring their prots from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, all divisions
of a rm can independently make their decisions as if they were operated in a decentralized setting.
This means that all downstream divisions are able to determine their own retail prices and decide on
whether or not they will buy from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. The transfer
pricing decision plays a very important role in the operation of a multidivisional rm, and it has been
of interest to accountants, economists, and managers. As Borstell and Hobster (on behalf of Ernst &
Young) reported in [3], 75% of parent and 81% of subsidiary respondents believe that transfer pricing
is absolutely criticalor very importantto their organizations.
1We note that the transfer price paid by the downstream division to the upstream division is similar to the wholesale
price paid by a retailer to the manufacturer. But, the di¤erence in this case is that both divisions belong to a single rm,
whereas the retailer and the manufacturer are usually assumed to be in a decentralized system.
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Since a multidivisional rm should not use transfer pricing as a tool for reducing the rms total
tax payment, in our models we assume that tax rates in all jurisdictions are approximately equal to
each other so that we can exclude the impact of tax rates on a multidivisional rms transfer pricing
decision. This is in line with most publications on transfer pricing problems which have not considered
the tax-related matters. For details, see a recent and fairly complete review by Göx and Schiller [7]
who surveyed a large number of transfer-pricing literature starting from Hirshleifers seminal, standard
model [9].
Appendix B Explanation on the Assumption 1 + bjc0()  0
To explain the assumption that 1 + bjc0()  0, we show that the sum of the upstream members and
each downstream members unit prots is increasing in the downstream members retail price, because
the downstream divisions are independent of each other. We consider the downstream division i, which
determines its retail price pi. The upstream divisions unit prot from trading with the division i is
calculated as the transfer price Ti paid by the downstream division i to the upstream division minus
the upstream divisions unit production cost c(Q(q)), i.e., Ti   c(Q(q)).
Since the downstream division i pays the transfer price Ti to the upstream division and achieves the
unit sales revenue pi, the divisions unit prot is pi   Ti. Therefore, the total prot of the upstream
division and the downstream division i is computed as i  pi   c(Q(q)).
Note that Q(q) is the upstream divisions total production quantity, i.e., Q(q) =
Pn
j=1 qj(pj), where
qj(pj) = aj   bjpj (for j = 1; : : : ; n) is the downstream division js order quantity. For our proof, we
re-write Q(q) as the sum of the downstream division is order quantity and other divisionsquantities,
i.e., Q(q) = qi(pi) +
P
j 6=i qj(pj).
The rst-order derivative of i w.r.t. pi can be computed as,
@i
@pi
=
@[pi   c(Q(q))]
@pi
= 1  bjc0(Q(q)),
which is greater than or equal to zero, i.e., 1   bjc0(Q(q))  0 (for j = 1; : : : ; n), if and only if i is
increasing in pi. Actually, this assumption is reasonable, because a rms unit prot should be usually
increasing in its retail price. But, the rms total prot is not always increasing in the price, because
the sales quantity is usually decreasing in the price.
Appendix C Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Since division i may be division U or may be division Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), we
need to analyze the impact of cooperation (between two, or among three or more, of the other divisions)
on division U and that on division Dj . If division i is U who does not cooperate with any other division
Dj , then whether or not n downstream divisions cooperate does not a¤ect division Us prot, because
of the following fact: When k (1  k  n) downstream divisions Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; k) cooperate, we can
easily nd from (1) that these divisionsoptimal retail prices maximizing
Pk
i=1 i(pi) is the same as
those maximizing i(pi) (for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k). Therefore, if i = U , then v(i) = 0.
We next consider the case that division i is a downstream division, e.g., division Dn. Then, division
U may cooperate with one or more of the other (n 1) downstream divisions (i.e., Dj , j = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1).
Without loss of generality, we assume that division U cooperates with k (1  k  n   1) downstream
divisionsDz, z = 1; 2; : : : ; k; and as a result, the (k+1)-division coalition Ck+1  (U , Dz, z = 1; 2; : : : ; k)
forms. For this coalition, divisions U and Dz (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) need to determine the k downstream
divisionsglobally-optimal retail prices p(k+1)z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k), in which the superscript (k + 1) means
that the optimal prices are made when divisions U and Dz (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) form the (k + 1)-division
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coalition Ck+1. Moreover, since division U also sells its intermediate products to the other (n  k   1)
downstream divisions (i.e., Dj , j = k+1; : : : ; n 1) in the non-cooperative setting, the upstream division
should determine its Stackelberg equilibrium transfer prices to division Dj (j = k+ 1; : : : ; n  1). Thus,
we should also determine transfer prices T^ (k+1)j (j = k + 1; : : : ; n   1), which denotes the Stackelberg
equilibria when divisions U and Dz (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) form the (k + 1)-division coalition Ck+1. The
upstream division Us and the downstream division Djs Stackelberg equilibria (for j = k+1; : : : ; n 1)
can be respectively calculated as,
T^
(k+1)
j =
2
bj
qj(p^
(k+1)
j ) + c(Q
(q; k + 1)) + c0(Q(q; k + 1))Q(q; k + 1),
p^
(k;r)
j = (aj + bj T^
(k;r)
j )=(2bj),
where
Q(q; k + 1) 
kX
z=1
qz(p
(k+1)
z ) +
n 1X
j=k+1
qj(p^
(k+1)
j ), (9)
and p(k+1)z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) denotes division Dzs globally-optimal retail price maximizing the total
prot of divisions U and Dz in the coalition Ck+1.
To nd p(k+1)z , for z = 1; 2; : : : ; k, we maximize the sum of the upstream divisions prot and the
downstream divisionsprots, which is written as,
max
p
(k+1)
z
 =
kX
z=1
p(k+1)z qz(p
(k+1)
z )  c(Q(q))Q(q) +
n 1X
j=k+1
T^
(k+1)
j qj(p^
(k+1)
j ), (10)
where Q(q) =
Pk
z=1 qz(p
(k+1)
z ) +
Pn 1
j=k+1 qj(p^
(k+1)
j ). The rst- and second-order derivatives of  w.r.t.
p
(k+1)
z are computed as,
@
@p
(k+1)
z
= qz(p
(k+1)
z )  bzp(k+1)z + bzc(Q(q)) + bzc0(Q(q))Q(q), (11)
@2
@(p
(k+1)
z )2
=  2bz[1 + bzc0(Q(q))]  b2zc00(Q(q))Q(q) < 0,
which implies that  is a concave function of p(k+1)z given the values of other decision variables. Setting
@=@p
(k+1)
z to zero and solving them for p
(k+1)
z , we have,
p(k+1)z =
1
bz
qz(p
(k+1)
z ) + c(Q
(q; k + 1)) + c0(Q(q; k + 1))Q(q; k + 1).
Next, we determine if the retail price is higher when more downstream divisions cooperate with the
upstream division. If division Dz and division U cooperate and form a two-division coalition, division
Dzs globally-optimal retail price can be determined by the following rst-order condition,
p(2)z  
qz(p
(2)
z )
bz
= c(qz(p
(2)
z )) + c
0(qz(p(2)z ))qz(p
(2)
z ). (12)
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We use p(2)z to replace pz in the rst-order derivative @=@pz in (11), and nd that
@
@pz

pz=p
(2)
z
= bz
(
[c( ~Q(q)) + c0( ~Q(q)) ~Q(q)] 
"
p(2)z  
qz(p
(2)
z )
bz
#)
,
where ~Q(q)  qz(p(2)z )+
P
i=1;:::;k, i 6=z qi(p
(k+1)
i )+
Pn 1
j=k+1 qj(p^
(k+1)
j ). Using (12), we rewrite the above
to
@
@pz

pz=p
(2)
z
= bzf[c( ~Q(q)) + c0( ~Q(q)) ~Q(q)]  [c(qz(p(2)z )) + c0(qz(p(2)z ))qz(p(2)z )]g,
which cannot be immediately determined as a positive or a negative value. Note that qz(p
(2)
z )  ~Q(q).
Therefore, if, for the production quantity Q, 2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0, then [c(Q) + c0(Q)Q] is decreasing
in Q and thus @=@pzjpz=p(2)z  0, which means p
(k+1)
z  p(2)z , because @=@pz is zero at the point
pz = p
(k+1)
z . Noting that p
(2)
z  p^, we nd that the quantity Q(q) in (9) when division U cooperates
with one or more downstream divisions should be greater than or equal to that when there is no
cooperation between U and any downstream division.
We then compute division Dns prot when k downstream divisions Dz (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) cooperate
with the upstream division U . We nd that the optimal transfer price from Dn to U is
T^ (k+1)n =
an
2bn
+
c(Q(q)) + c0(Q(q))Q(q)
2
.
If 2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0 for any production quantity Q, we nd that, when the (k+ 1)-division coalition
Ck+1 forms, T^
(k+1)
n is lower than T^n Stackelberg equilibrium when division U does not cooperate
with any downstream division and the Dns prot (p^
(k+1)
n ) = (an   bnT^ (k+1)n )2=(4bn) is thus higher
than that when there is no cooperation between division U and any downstream division. This means
that division Dn benets from the cooperation between divisions U and Dz (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k); hence,
its characteristic value division Dns minimum prot surplus should be zero when divisions U and
Dz (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) does not cooperate, i.e., v(Dn) = 0. Similarly, we can nd that v(Di) = 0, for
i = 1; : : : ; n  1. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. In order to compute v(Crk), we need to nd (k  1) optimal retail prices p(k;r)i
(i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) that maximize total prot of all members in Crk. Similar to our discussion in Section
2.1.1, we can calculated p(k;r)i as shown in (5), and also found T^
(k;r)
j as in this theorem. Moreover, we
nd that, under the assumption that 2c0(Q) + c00(Q)Q  0 for any production quantity Q, then p(k;r)i
and T^ (k;r)j decreases as k rises, which means that if more divisions cooperate, then their retail prices
and division Us transfer prices should be reduced.
Substituting p(k;r)i (i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) and T^ (k;r)j (j 2 fj j Dj =2 Crkg) into (4) gives the maximum
prot as,
(k;r) =
X
fijDi2Crkg
[p
(k;r)
i   c(Q(q; k; r))]qi(p(k;r)i ) +
X
fjjDj =2Crkg
[T^
(k;r)
j   c(Q(q; k; r))]qj(p^(k;r)j ),
where p^(k;r)j = (aj + bj T^
(k;r)
j )=(2bj). Note that the prot surplus v(Crk) is equal to total prot 
(k;r)
when divisions U and Di (i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) join Crk to cooperate for maximizing their total prot
minus that when these divisions do not cooperate but make their decisions in the non-cooperative setting.
In the non-cooperative setting, all divisions that are not in Crk choose their Stackelberg equilibria, and
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thus, the sum of division Us and division Dis (i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) prots is calculated as,
^(k;r) =
X
fijDi2Crkg
[p^
(1)
i   c(Q^(q))]qi(p^(1)i ) +
X
fjjDj =2Crkg
[T^
(1)
j   c(Q^(q))]qj(p^(1)j ),
where p^(1)i = (ai + biT^
(1)
i )=(2bi) (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) denotes division Dis Stackelberg equilibrium when
division U does not cooperate with any downstream division; and Q^(q)  Pni=1 qi(p^(1)i ). We then
compute the characteristic value (prot surplus achieved by Crk) as v(C
r
k) = 
(k;r)   ^(k;r), which can
specied as in (6). Since p(k;r)i (i 2 fi j Di 2 Crkg) and T^ (k;r)j (j 2 fj j Dj =2 Crkg) are the global solution
maximizing (k;r), we can conclude that (k;r)  ^(k;r) and v(Crk)  0.
Proof of Theorem 3. Since, if a cooperative games characteristic function is supermodular, then the
game must be convex and superadditive, we next need to show the supermodularity. Using Driessens
approach [4], we should prove that v(S1[fig) v(S1)  v(S2[fig) v(S2), for all S1  S2  Cn+1nfig.
We can easily nd that, if division U does not belong to C2, then this division is not in the coalition
S1, and thus v(S1 [fig)  v(S1) = v(S1 [fig) and v(S2 [fig)  v(S2) = v(S2 [fig). Since v(S1 [fig) 
v(S2 [ fig) as indicated by Corollary 2, we have v(S1 [ fig)  v(S1)  v(S2 [ fig)  v(S2). If division U
is in S2 but is not in the coalition S1, then v(S1 [ fig) = v(S1) = 0 and v(S2 [ fig)  v(S2)  0, and it
thus follows that v(S1 [ fig)  v(S1)  v(S2 [ fig)  v(S2).
Next, we consider the case in which division U is in the coalition S1. This means that division U is
also in S2. W.l.o.g., we assume that S1 and S2 are k1  and k2 division coalitions with k2  k1. Using
Theorem 2, we nd that
[v(S2 [ fig)  v(S2)]  [v(S1 [ fig)  v(S1)] = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4, (13)
where
1 
X
j2S1
f[p(k2+1)j   c(Q(q; k2 + 1))]qj(p(k2+1)j )  [p(k2)j   c(Q(q; k2))]qj(p(k2)j )g
 
X
j2S1
f[p(k1+1)j   c(Q(q; k1 + 1))]qj(p(k1+1)j )  [p(k1)j   c(Q(q; k1))]qj(p(k1)j )g,
which is non-negative, because, as Corollary 1 indicates, [p(k)j   c(Q(q; k))]qj(p(k)j ) is an increasing,
convex function. In (13), 2 is dened as,
2 
X
j =2S1
f[T^ (k2+1)j   c(Q(q; k2 + 1))]qj(p^(k2+1)j )  [T^ (k2)j   c(Q(q; k2))]qj(p^(k2)j )g
 
X
j =2S1
f[T^ (k1+1)j   c(Q(q; k1 + 1))]qj(p^(k1+1)j )  [T^ (k1)j   c(Q(q; k1))]qj(p^(k1)j )g,
which is also non-negative because [T^ (k)j   c(Q(q; k))]qj(p^(k)j ) is an increasing and convex function, as
indicated in Corollary 1. The term 3 in (13) is dened as,
3  [p(k2+1)i   c(Q(q; k2 + 1))]qi(p(k2+1)i )  [p(k1+1)i   c(Q(q; k1 + 1))]qi(p(k1+1)i )
 [T^ (k2)i   c(Q(q; k))]qi(p^(k2)i ) + [T^ (k1)i   c(Q(q; k1))]qi(p^(k1)i ),
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which is non-negative, as we show in the proof of Corollary 2. The term 4 in (13) is as,
4 
X
j2S2 S1
f(p(k2+1)j   T (k2+1)j )qj(p(k2+1)j )  (p(k2)j   T (k2)j )qj(p(k2)j )g
+
X
j2S2 S1
f[T (k2+1)j   c(Q(q; k2 + 1))]qj(p(k2+1)j )  [T (k2)j   c(Q(q; k2))]qj(p(k2)j )g
 
X
j2S2 S1
f[T^ (k2+1)j   c(Q(q; k2 + 1))]qj(p^(k2+1)j )  [T^ (k2)j   c(Q(q; k2))]qj(p^(k2)j )g,
where is non-negative according to Corollary 1.
In conclusion, the characteristic function of this game is supermodular, and thus, the game is convex
and superadditive.
Proof of Theorem 4. This theorem follows from the superadditivity of our (n+1)-division cooperative
game (which is shown in Theorem 3). More specically, we assume that all divisions form z (z  2)
disjoint, less-than-(n + 1)-division but non-empty coalitions C01;C02; : : : ;C0z; that is, C0i 6= ? and C0i 
Cn+1, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; z; C0i \ C0j = ?, for i; j = 1; 2; : : : ; z, i 6= j; and [zi=1C0i = Cn+1. Thus, the total
prot surpluses achieved by all divisions in the coalitions C0i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; z) is
Pz
i=1 v(C0i), which is
no more than v(Cn+1), because the cooperative game is superadditive according to Theorem 3. This
proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. In order to calculate Shapley value, we need to identify all possible coalitions
that each division joins. Next, we consider division Dj , j = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and calculate Shapley value yDj
for this division. When divisionDj does not cooperate with any other divisions but joins the one-division
coalition (Dj), we nd from Section 2.1.1 that v(Dj) = 0. It thus follows that v(Dj)  v(?) = 0.
If division Dj cooperates with one or more of the other downstream divisions to form a coalition, we
then need to consider whether or not division U is also in the coalition since, as discussed previously, the
characteristic value of a coalition that does not include the U is zero. Therefore, if division Dj joins the
coalition S (i.e., Dj 2 S) but division U does not join S (i.e., U =2 S), then we have v(S) v(S fDjg) = 0.
We next compute the value of v(S)   v(S   fDjg), where S includes division U (i.e., U 2 S) and
it is a possible coalition that division Dj joins. Assume that S is a k-division coalition Ck(U;Dj)
(2  k  n+ 1) that includes U , Dj and, if k  3, one or more of the other downstream divisions. Note
that there are Cn 1k 2 k division coalitions, which are denoted by Crk(U;Dj), r = 1; 2; : : : ; Cn 1k 2 . Hence,
for a given value of k, we can nd thatP
j2S(jSj   1)!(n+ 1  jSj)![v(S)  v(S  fjg)]
(n+ 1)!
=
PCn 1k 2
r=1 (k   1)!(n+ 1  k)![v(Crk(U;Dj))  v(Crk(U;Dj)  fDjg)]
(n+ 1)!
,
where v(Crk(U;Dj)) and v(C
r
k(U;Dj)  fDjg) can be calculated by using (6).
The Shapley value yi (i = D1; D2; : : : ; Dn) is thus calculated as in (7). Since
P
i2Cn+1 y

i = v(Cn+1),
we easily nd that the Shapley value for division U is yU = v(Cn+1)  
Pn
j=1 y

Dj
. Since our (n + 1)-
division cooperative game is convex as shown in Theorem 3, the Shapley value must be in the core.
Proof of Theorem 6. Since the allocation to division i is yi , for i = U;D1; D2; : : : ; Dn, we can
nd that (p(n+1)j )   (p^(1)j ) = yDj , for division Dj (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). Because (p
(n+1)
j ) = (p
(n+1)
j  
T j )qj(p
(n+1)
j ) and (p^
(1)
j ) = (aj   bj T^ (1)j )2=4bj , we can easily calculate T j as shown in (8).
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Appendix D Proofs of Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1. Using Theorem 2, we can calculate the prot margin of divisions U
and Di as mi  qi(p(k;r)i )=bi + c0(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r), where Q(q; k; r) 
P
fijDi2Crkg qi(p
(k;r)
i ) +P
fjjDj =2Crkg qj(p^
(k;r)
j ). Di¤erentiating mi once and twice w.r.t. qi(p
(k)
i ) gives
@mi
@qi(p
(k;r)
i )
= 1=bi + c
0(Q(q; k; r)) + c00(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r)  0,
@2mi
@[qi(p
(k;r)
i )]
2
= 2c00(Q(q; k; r)) + c000(Q(q; k; r))Q(q; k; r)  0,
if c000()  0. Note that, as k increases, then p(k;r)i decreases (as shown in Theorem 2) and qi(p(k;r)i )
increases, and thus mi increases. Similarly, we can show that division Us prot margin [i.e., T^
(k;r)
j  
c(Q(q; k; r))] is increasing in qj(p^
(k;r)
j ), but it is a convex function of qj(p^
(k;r)
j ) if c
000()  0.
Proof of Corollary 2. We consider the case that the upstream division U and (k   1) downstream
divisions (e.g., Dj , j = 1; 2; : : : ; k   1) who are now in the coalition Ck decide to cooperate the
downstream division Dk, and thus form a (k + 1)-division coalition Ck+1. Using (6) we can write the
characteristic value v(Ck+1) as
v(Ck+1) =
kX
i=1
f[p(k+1)i   c(Q(q; k + 1))]qi(p(k+1)i )  [p^(1)i   c(Q^(q))]qi(p^(1)i )g
+
nX
j=k+1
f[T^ (k+1)j   c(Q(q; k + 1))]qj(p^(k+1)j )  [T^ (1)j   c(Q^(q))]qj(p^(1)j )g
We then calculate v(Ck+1)  v(Ck) as,
v(Ck+1)  v(Ck) = [p(k+1)k   c(Q(q; k + 1))]qk(p(k+1)k )  [p^(1)k   c(Q^(q))]qk(p^(1)k )
 [T^ (k)k   c(Q(q; k))]qk(p^(k)k ) + [T^ (1)k   c(Q^(q))]qk(p^(1)k )
+
k 1X
i=1
f[p(k+1)i   c(Q(q; k + 1))]qi(p(k+1)i )  [p(k)i   c(Q(q; k))]qi(p(k)i )g
+
nX
j=k+1
f[T^ (k+1)j   c(Q(q; k + 1))]qj(p^(k+1)j )
 [T^ (k)j   c(Q(q; k))]qj(p^(k)j )g, (14)
which is non-negative according to Corollary 1. More precisely, from Corollary 1, we nd that [p(k+1)k  
c(Q(q; k + 1))]qk(p
(k+1)
k )  [p(k)k   c(Q(q; k))]qk(p(k)k ). Thus, the rst two terms in (14) can be
written as
[p
(k+1)
k   c(Q(q; k + 1))]qk(p(k+1)k )  [p^(1)k   c(Q^(q))]qk(p^(1)k )
 [T^ (k)k   c(Q(q; k))]qk(p^(k)k ) + [T^ (1)k   c(Q^(q))]qk(p^(1)k )
 (p(k)k   T^ (k)k )qk(p(k)k )  (p^(1)k   T^ (1)k )qk(p^(1)k ),
which is non-negative, according to Corollary 1. It also follows from Corollary 1 that both the third
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and the fourth terms are non-negative. This corollary is thus proved.
Appendix E Calculation of the Characteristic Values in Example 1
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the characteristic values (prot surpluses) of an empty coalition and one-
division coalitions are zero, i.e., v(?) = v(U) = v(D1) = v(D2) = v(D3) = 0. Moreover, as discussed in
Section 2.1.2, for the two- and three-division coalitions that do not include U , the characteristic values
are also zero; that is, v(D1D2) = v(D1D3) = v(D2D3) = v(D1D2D3) = 0.
To nd the characteristic values of the other two- and three-division coalitions and that of the
four-division (grand) coalition, we should use Theorem 2 to calculate all divisionsoptimal decisions in
all possible coalition structures, which are presented in Table 1, where f(U); (D1); (D2); (D3)g denotes
the coalition structure in which there is no cooperation between any two, or among any three or
four, divisions; f(U); (D1D2); (D3)g denotes the coalition structure in which only divisions D1 and D2
cooperate whereas divisions U and D3 make their decisions in the non-cooperative setting; and so on.
For a coalition structure, division(s) who join a coalition choose the globally-optimal retail pricing
decisions that maximize the total prot in the coalition; and division(s) who do not join any coalition
choose the Stackelberg equilibrium as their retail and transfer pricing decisions. As Theorem 2 indicates,
if a coalition involves the upstream division U and one or more downstream divisions, these divisions
in the coalition only need to determine retail pricing decisions to maximize their total prot. Their
transfer pricing decisions should be determined by using Theorem 6 so as to allocate their total prot
fairly.
In addition, one may note that, for some coalition structures (e.g., f(U); (D1); (D2); (D3)g, f(U);
(D1D2); (D3)g, etc.) in Table 1, optimal decisions are the same; this occurs because, in those coalition
structures, the upstream division does not cooperate with any downstream divisions and all divisions
decisions are Stackelberg equilibria.
Coalition Optimal Decisions
Structure T1 T2 T3 p1 p2 p3
f(U); (D1); (D2); (D3)g $102:01 $227:02 $57:00 $151:00 $338:51 $83:50
f(U); (D1D2); (D3)g $102:01 $227:02 $57:00 $151:00 $338:51 $83:50
f(U); (D1); (D2D3)g $102:01 $227:02 $57:00 $151:00 $338:51 $83:50
f(U); (D1D3); (D2)g $102:01 $227:02 $57:00 $151:00 $338:51 $83:50
f(UD1); (D2); (D3)g   $226:52 $56:52 $101:52 $338:26 $83:26
f(UD2); (D1); (D3)g $101:54   $56:56 $150:76 $226:54 $83:28
f(UD3); (D1); (D2)g $101:50 $226:50   $150:75 $338:25 $56:50
f(UD1D2); (D3)g     $56:29 $101:29 $226:29 $83:14
f(UD1D3); (D2)g   $226:24   $101:24 $338:12 $56:24
f(UD2D3); (D1)g $101:29     $150:63 $226:27 $56:27
f(U); (D1D2D3)g $102:01 $227:02 $57:00 $151:00 $338:51 $83:50
f(UD1D2D3)g       $101:02 $226:02 $56:02
Table 1: All divisionsoptimal decisions in all possible coalition structures.
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We notice from Table 1 that all divisions retail prices and transfer prices decrease when more
divisions cooperate, as indicated in Theorem 2.
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